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Sexual Offenses -
LEGAL AND
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
S. OLEY CUTLER, S. J.*
N ANY DISCUSSION of sexual offenses and the law the first problem to be
faced is to determine exactly what is meant by the term "sexual offense."
At the outset of his article in this symposium, Dr. Cavanagh takes notice
of this difficulty.' No scholar has recognized and clarified this definition
problem as well as Dr. Mueller in a recent book dealing with this subject..2
There are, he notes., the obvious classes of prohibited acts, the definition
of which all would agree upon, such as solicitation, rape, various kinds
of sexual assaults, etc. In our presentation here, we shall omit a discussion
of these "undisputed areas" of crime. We will also pass over cases which
clearly are the product of mental disease or defect-insanity cases. A
further complication arises in defining "sexual offenses" because there
are criminal acts which are sexual in nature but whose motivation is sheer
profit. Again, there are acts such as kleptomania, arson, etc., which fall
into criminal law categories as offenses against property, although the
offense itself may often have an obvious sexual motivation such as the
working out of a problem through vicarious experience. More broadly,
topics such as obscenity seem to fall into the basic category of sexual
offenses. It will be our endeavor in this article to treat first the general
problem area of sexual offenses, since this currently is the subject of most
debate. Afterwards, we shall consider several specific offenses.
Recent Trends for Legal Reform
There are trends constantly observable in the field of criminal law
and its enforcement both here and abroad - trends which are moving
* A.B., M.A., Boston College; LL.B., Georgetown University. Assistant Professor
of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
I Cavanagh, Sexual Anomalies and the Law, 9 CATHOLIC LAWYER 1, 4 (1963).
2 MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT 10-12 (1961).
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towards basic reforms. At times a specific
reform movement may seem novel and even
dangerous to some, yet surely, it must be
conceded that what has been most accom-
plished by such movements has been the
stimulation of basic thinking on the pur-
poses of our entire system of criminal law
and its administration in our society. There
are several noteworthy examples of such
trends and movements. The now famous
Royal Commission's Report on Capital
Punishment' in England which was followed
shortly after by the Durham decision' in
this country, inflamed the still raging con-
troversy over the validity of the M'Naghten
Rule as a defense of insanity in criminal
cases.
Current interest in the topic of this sym-
posium was undoubtedly triggered by the
publication of Dr. Kinsey's Reports, ' the
Report of the English Wolfenden Commis-
sionl' and finally, the American Law Insti-
tute's official draft of its Model Penal Code.
7
This latter publication - a work of many
years' extensive research on the part of
many of America's most distinguished
scholars in the field of criminal law and its
administration - is a document worthy of
serious consideration.
The Wolfenden Report
As Mr. J. E. Hall-Williams indicated in
The report was presented to Parliament at the
request of Her Majesty, The Queen, in September,
1953.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
" KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN & GEBHARD, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE AMERICAN MALE (1948); cf.
KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN & GEBHARD, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE AMERICAN FEMALE (1953).
i Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prosti-
tution, Report, CMD. No. 247 (1957).
MODEL PENAL CODE (Prepared Official Draft
1962).
1960,8 the British experience with full-scale
investigations and proposed reforms in the
field of sexual offenses has been a long and
comprehensive one. After World War I, the
increase in reported sexual offenses through-
out Great Britain led to a thorough govern-
ment investigation in 1924. Although this
group made at least forty-three recommen-
dations for legal reform, little reform legis-
lation resulted.!' Another study was made in
1928.11
The Wolfenden Committee on Homosex-
ual Offenses and Prostitution was created in
1954 and reported its findings to the Home
Secretary three years later." Numerous sug-
gestions were made by this latter group for
changes in existing British statutes on pros-
titution. Some of these ideas, although not
their spirit, were incorporated in the new
Street Offenses Act of 1959. The specific
question of prostitution will be discussed
later in this article.
Of greatest importance, perhaps, were
the views which this Committee reported on
the question of homosexuality. Here its
principal recommendation was for the legal-
ization of homosexual acts committed pri-
vately between consenting adults. The
British reaction to this was, of course, highly
controversial.
ALl Model Penal Code
On this side of the Atlantic, the American
Law Institute had been working for many
s Hall-Williams, Sex Offenses: The British Expe-
rience, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 335
(1960).
9 Departmental Committee on Sexual Offenses
Against Young People, Report, CMD. No. 1561
(1925).
-o Street Offenses Committee, Report, CMD. No.
3231 (1928).
11 Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prosti-
tution, Report, CMD. No. 247 (1957).
years towards a final form of its Model
Penal Code. Such a final revision was sub-
mitted to and approved by its membership
at the Institute's annual meeting in Wash-
ing, D. C., in May of 1962. The Institute in
its Code did not espouse the "mutual con-
sent" approach with respect to homosexual
acts, as did the Wolfenden Report. In its
original form, as proposed by its Reporters
and unanimously approved by the Advisory
Committee, the Wolfenden "consensual ap-
proach" was followed. 12 This move was not
approved by the Council of the Institute."
As the ALI's then tentative Draft No. 4
declared:
Some members believe that the Reporters'
position is the rational one but that it would
be totally unacceptable to American legis-
latures and would prejudice acceptance of
the Code generally. Other members of the
Council oppose the position of the Reporters
and the Advisory Committee on the ground
that sodomy is a cause or symptom of moral
decay in a society and should be repressed
by law .... 4
With respect to the corruption of the
morals of minors, treated in a subsequent
section of the Code, persons who engage in
deviate sexual acts are guilty of an offense
only if the other participant is under the age
of sixteen and the actor is at least four years
older.' 5 These ages of consent, the Institute
concedes, are arbitrary ones, and it leaves
to individual lawmaking bodies the final
determination."'
Although such leeway is evident here for
legislative choice, the permissive approach
12 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
1r, Ibid.
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of the Institute is quite apparent throughout
its entire treatment of this and related sexual
offenses. Authorities admit this to be the
ALI intent? 7 This basic Institute approach
raises doubts as to the willingness on the
part of the American community to accept
some of the basic moral assumptions of the
Institute. It would seem that its present rec-
ommendations face as hard a fight for gen-
eral acceptance as its proposed revision of
the M'Naghten Rule as a defense in
criminal cases.
General Moral Norms
Returning now to the Wolfenden pro-
posals, we observe a most interesting and
controversial moral reaction. At this point,
as we discuss general moral norms, we re-
strict our attention to the single issue of
homosexual offenses.
Among the principal observations at the
end of its own report, the Wolfenden Com-
mittee made it quite clear that, as a group,
it was fully aware of the agonizingly difficult
decisions it had been called on to make. This
is an area, it declared, where "there is no
frontier more controversial." 1
British religious reaction to the Commit-
tee's proposals was easily predictable from
the nature of the testimony given the Com-
mittee by the Church of England Moral and
Welfare Committee which had declared:
It is not the function of the State and law to
constitute themselves guardians of private
morality and thus to deal with sin as such
belongs to the province of the church. On
the other hand, it is the duty of the State to
punish crimes and it may take cognizance of
and define as criminal those sins which also
17 Cf. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL
CONDUCT 22 (1961).
IS Street Offenses Committee, Report, CMD. No.
3231, at 38-49 (1928).
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constitute offenses against public morality.",
The Anglican Council's attitude towards
existing legal restrictions on consensual,
adult homosexual activities has aptly been
described as one of "laissez-faire." 1,
Official Catholic reaction was expressed
by His Grace The Archbishop of West-
minster through a statement of his printed
in the Westminster Cathedral Chronicle:
The civil law takes cognizance primarily of
public acts. Private acts as such are outside
its scope.
However there are certain private acts
which have public consequence in so far as
they affect the common good. These acts
may rightly be subject to civil law.
It may be, however, that the civil law
cannot effectively control such acts without
doing more harm to the common good than
the acts themselves would do. In that case it
may be necessary in the interests of the
common good to tolerate without approving
such acts.2 1
Specifically, as to legislation of homosexual
offenses, His Grace continued:
1. As regards the moral law, Catholic moral
teaching is:
(i) Homosexual acts arc grieviously sin-
ful.
(ii) That in view of the public conse-
quences of these acts, e.g., the harm
which would result to the common
good if homosexual conduct became
widespread or an accepted mode of
conduct in the public mind, the civil
law does not exceed its legitimate
scope if it attempts to control them
by making them crimes.
The teaching authority of the Bishops is
primarily concerned with laying down these
two principles of law which cannot be
denied by any Catholic.
- Id. at 38.
20 Fletcher, Sex Oflenses: An Ethical View, 25
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 240, 250 (1960).
L' Quoted in BUCKLEY, MORALITY AND THE HoNMo-
SEXUAL 197 (1959).
2. However, two questions of fact arise:
(i) If the law takes cognizance of pri-
vate acts of homosexuality and
makes them crimes, do worse evils
follow for the common good?
(ii) Since homosexual acts between con-
senting males are now crimes in law,
would a change in the law harm the
common good by seeming to con-
done homosexual conduct?'-'2
To some extent, at least, British Catholic
thinking leaves the door open on the two
so-called "questions of fact." Nevertheless,
in a volume published by an English priest
shortly after the appearance of the Wolfen-
den Report, we discover a clear "no" to the
above two questions of fact.2:1 The Catholic
Archbishop of Liverpool seems to hold a
similar view.-
On the subject of homosexual offenses,
the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, as we have already seen, eschews the
all-or-nothing Wolfenden approach. As a
consequence, in this country there has been
no such sharp definition of the issue as we
observe in Great Britain. Because of the
state of the question here, it seems best to
bring this entire issue down to its most basic
elements.
Law and Morals
As in Great Britain, so here, most schol-
ars of the problem of sexual offenses (or
even the specific one of homosexuality) and
the law are keenly aware that the real ques-
tion here - the relationship of law to mor-
ality - must first be met and answered. That
our criminal law both in origin, development
and spirit is permeated with moral concepts
'2 Id. at 198.
23 Ibid.
211d., Foreword at xix-xxiii.
is a fact beyond all dispute. 25 Nowhere is
this fact more evident than in the area of
criminal responsibility, traditionally repre-
sented by the mens rea concept. It is no
accident we find this in society as it matures
towards more civilized levels, because many
of these moral aspects of our criminal law
represent the dread decision of adjudging
guilt and affixing punishments, sometimes
even death, to our fellow human beings. It
is not enough, as in discussions on the aboli-
tion of sanctions against consensual homo-
sexual acts between adults, to draw again to
our common attention the liaison between
public morality and private morality. To
state this obvious truth and then to conclude
that problems can be easily solved by one
group of society, with no relevancy to the
rest of society, is surely a great oversimpli-
fication.
To oppose the increasing tendency to
permissiveness in criminal law towards sex-
ual offenses, especially as to homosexual
offenses, should not be considered as an
attempt by one segment of society to impose
its ethics or beliefs upon others. The so-
called "modern school" which favors aboli-
tion of certain criminal sanctions agrees.2 6
In admitting the necessity of retaining or
even stiffening2 7 sanctions against violent
assaults, etc., the modern school itself con-
cedes that there are common goals towards
which society aspires to move. This also
should imply, I think, that "private acts"
25 Cf. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law,
49 YALE L.J. 987 (1940); HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 158-59 (1947).
26 Cf. MUELLER, op. cit. supra note 17.
7 Ploscowe, Sex 0jenses, The American Legal
Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 217, 224
(1960).
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may possibly have an effect upon the com-
munity and upon the common good if legal-
ization of homosexual practices in private
would lead to the breakdown of a nation's
strength and integrity. Consent has never
made a right out of a wrong. What is in-
volved here is aptly reflected in the distinc-
tion of Catholic moral teaching between ob-
jective and subjective moral guilt. Great as
may be our collective sympathy for the un-
fortunates afflicted with homosexual prob-
lems, we cannot take individual hardships as
the basis for general legal norms.
Some Catholic opponents of any legal
reform in this area, such as Father Buckley,
mentioned above, 2- tend to oversimplify this
problem by demanding almost absolute re-
sponsibility in every case. Advocates of
sweeping reforms, on the other hand, seem
to find little, if any, responsibility in these
cases. One group diminishes freedom to the
vanishing point, while the other demands
too much. Both positions, I believe, are
equally untenable. Father Burlchaell, a se-
vere critic of Father Buckley's opinion, 211
insists that this view fails to take into con-
sideration the etiology of what is truly a
mental condition. If medical science has
given us new insights into this problem, can
we still treat the occasional "harmless" type
of offender in the same fashion as we would
a hardened criminal? Obviously we cannot,
for the collective conscience of the com-
munity refuses to inflict punishment where
it cannot discover responsible human be-
havior. Catholic moralists have long since
given this subjective aspect of the offender
28 See note 21 supra.
9 Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists Bull., July 1960,
p. 193.
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the profound restudy it deserved."
If the homosexual offender does represent
a mental problem, the ordinary laws, it
seems to me, should be called upon to han-
dle such situations. In many states of the
United States, such laws are called sexual
psychopath statutes. These laws, of course,
cry out for modernization, as most authori-
ties have demanded. One such voice de-
clared recently:
Unfortunately the vagueness of defini-
tion of sexual psychopath contained in these
statutes has obscured their basic underlying
purpose....
The result, is that many nuisance type,
nondangerous sex offenders have been im-
prisoned for long periods of time, without
treatment, in those jurisdictions where such
laws have been enforced."
Long imprisonment, characteristic of such
statutes, is no solution without adequate
prison medical therapy. The above authority
is aware of this and suggests rather:
This is not to say that the compulsive,
nondangerous types of sex offenders should
be immune from prosecution and punish-
ment; but short sentences or probation are
more than adequate to deal with these delic-
tions, unless better facilities are provided.' '
As for the dangerous, repetitive sex of-
fender who oftentimes resorts to violence in
their molestation of youth, this same au-
thority calls for stronger penalties - up to
life imprisonment when necessary. Parole
should be based on proven rehabilitation
and demonstrated improvement.: The
American Law Institute proposals reflect a
:o Cf. FORD & KELLY, CONTEMPORARY MORAL
THEOLOGY (1958); HAGMAIER & GLEASON, COUN-
SELLING THE CATHOLIC 231 (1959).
Ploscowe, supra note 27, at 223.
:- Ibid.
:13 Ploscowe, supra note 27, at 224.
similar view."
Some of the other more common argu-
ments in favor of abolition of sanctions upon
homosexual acts committed privately be-
tween consenting adults are: the unenforce-
ability of present laws, difficulties in secur-
ing evidence, and the absence of violence
which outrages public decency.
All of these arguments could be true and
not necessarily represent reasonable justifi-
cation for abolition of sanctions; reform by
way of law revision might be more appro-
priate.
Natural and Normal
The designation of certain sexual offenses
of a perverse type has traditionally been in
terms such as "unnatural." '3 5 Unfortunately,
such terminology suffers an easy onslaught
from those who rightfully attempt to define
the "natural" or "normal" man. Hence fol-
lows the accusation that many of our sex
offenders statutes are anachronistic because
they reflect the spirit of "unnatural" termi-
nology, which in turn reflect the values of
another era and of an outworn philosophy.
Of course, no serious writer who is at all
acquainted with the scholastic natural law
tradition would be so naive as to confound
it with the desiccated concepts of "natural
law" and "nature" as find expression in the
moralistic Commentaries of Blackstone.
This attempt at defining the "natural"
and hence the "normal," presents a real dif-
ficulty, it seems, to some modern commen-
'I" MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix D at 288 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
:15 Cf. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW 503 (1882); BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 214. For an interesting dis-
cussion of such statutes, see also State v. Williams,
34 La. Ann. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
tators.3 6 The following is a characteristic
statement of this problem:
It is true that current law and morals re-
gard every other sexual activity [i.e., other
than ordinary marital intercourse] as unnat-
ural. But surely this is unreal, for natural
can be only that which is conditioned and
determined by nature. Thus, if upon exam-
ining a man charged with sodomy.., we
find that the hormone structure of his body
is predominantly female, although his phys-
ical appearance is predominantly male, it
seems that his behaviour was rather natural,
namely in accordance with his natural en-
dowment. It is seriously questioned, there-
fore, whether current definitions of "the
natural" are in accordance with reality, and
whether the law should continue to regard
what it thinks to be abnormal as also im-
plicitly unnatural.37
The question of the advisability of retain-
ing such terminology as "natural," etc., has
already been discussed. Yet, surely, this
cannot mean we must therefore dispose of
the term "normal" also, or even to identify
the two. Although every law student admits
to initial problems in defining the "reason-
able, prudent man" and even "normal," it
is well known that this is a practical and
working norm, necessary for most of the law
of torts as well as of crimes. A distinguished
American psychiatrist some years ago at-
tempted his definition of the "normal man"
for just such needs as we have here. He
declared:
The normal person may be defined as
one who conforms to the average human
being in his methods of thinking, feeling,
willing and acting, is reasonably happy,
emotionally balanced and adjusted and ori-
36 Cf. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL
CONDUCT 20-21 (1961).
37 Id. at 21.
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ented towards future goals.38
Undoubtedly, the term normal is an
equivocal one. Its many meanings are well
described by Father John Ford:
Some psychiatrists seem to object to
using it at all - as if it had no meaning, as
if there were no such thing as a normal
person."
Father Ford also suggests that normal can
mean "conformed to some ideal standard."
Abnormal, therefore, will be identified with
anyone who falls short of such a standard.
Again, it can mean "average," as where
measurable qualities are involved. Finally,
it can mean conformity to conduct which is
usual in a given group. Of course, if such
conduct were wrong, as lying, it would be
considered abnormal not to conform to such
evil.
So many meanings might suggest that
there is no such being as a normal person.
It would seem that those who object to the
word normal, as having little or no meaning,
fasten their attention too exclusively on one
or another of these meanings. They are
impressed also by the fact that so-called
"normality" shades off into so-called "ab-
normality" by imperceptible degrees.... It
is natural enough, but fallacious neverthe-
less, to conclude that because one cannot
draw a definite line separating normal from
abnormal, therefore there is no real distinc-
tion between them .... 40
In conclusion to this present discussion,
then, we state again that the law is inexor-
ably joined to the entire gamut of moral
issues- from determining criminal respon-
sibility to assigning criminal sanctions
s Cavanagh, Criminal Responsibility and Free
Will, Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists Bull., Dec.
1955, pp. 24-25.
:i9 FORD & KELLY, op. cit. supra note 30, at 347.
.0 FORD & KELLY, CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOL-
OGY 348 (1958).
SEXUAL OFFENSES
against prohibited behaviour. Law surely
cannot legislate morality in the sense that it
cannot automatically create the perfect man,
operating freely within an ideal human
society.
To be perfectly practical, we must finally
ask ourselves: Can we safely remove restric-
tions on aberrant sexual conduct? Perhaps
we could, on the basis of the principle earlier
stated by the Archbishop of Westminster'
that the toleration of evil is often necessary
for the promotion of the common good. On
the other hand, abolition might well lead to
greater dangers than already exist in this
perplexing area. This is what I particularly
fear, because any proposed legal reform
here involves necessarily the definition of
"adult," that is to say, involves the setting
of age limits. At best this is a very difficult
task. State statutes establishing a lower age
limit for drinking are ample evidence of
this. With the possibility of the moral cor-
ruption of our younger citizens involved, I
believe that the abolition of existing sanc-
tions on sexual conduct (even if consensual)
is too risky an experiment to hazard. This
simply is not a case of private, individual
morality.
Specific Problems
Although it is obviously impossible with-
in the confines of this article to discuss every
aspect of sexual offenses from a viewpoint
of law and morality, still several specific
problem areas call for some brief comment.
Prostitution
From the vast number of statutes in the
United States covering all features of the
contemporary prostitution problem, and
41 Cf. text accompanying notes 21-22.
from the notable absence of any strong re-
form movements among various groups in
our society, one is forced to agree with a
recent conclusion:
Within the sphere of sexual offenses, no
problem is harder to tackle, legally, socio-
logically or psychologically, than that of
prostitution.... Suffice it to say that the law
has no intention to give up trying to repress
prostitution by the methods at its command.
Evidence gathered by the United Nations on
a world-wide basis makes this course appear
preferable to a permissive attitude of legal-
ized and state-regulated prostitution.42
The American Law Institute in its study
of the question, notes that although prosti-
tution is prohibited in all American jurisdic-
tions, the number of prostitutes may be
upwards of 200,000 here .4  Admittedly, a
problem does exist here. In Great Britain,
for example, the Wolfenden Committee re-
ported a marked increase in the number of
arrests, prosecutions and convictions, espe-
cially for solicitations for prostitution dur-
ing the past twenty years. 44 The Committee
observed two main defects in then existing
British law which could account for some of
this increase. Both were concerned with the
definition of the elements of the offense and
the difficulty in substantiating these ele-
ments in a court of law. The Committee's
proposals for reform were directed in the
main to driving off the streets sources of
annoyance to the public and occasions for
affronts to public decency. Shortly after the
publication of the Wolfenden Report, the
new Street Offenses Act was passed." Only
42 MUELLER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 49.
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1959).
44Cf. Committee on Homosexual Offenses and
Prostitution, Report, CMD. No. 247 at 143 (1957).
4'Street Offenses Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 57.
some of the Committee's proposals were
incorporated in the new legislation. From
what has been reported so far, the new law
seems to be operating satisfactorily.
The British spirit of nonintervention into
what has been called "the private life of
consenting men and women," 46 is reflected
in most of the modern thinking on the pros-
titution problem.4 7 Rather than trends
towards abolition of present-day criminal
sanctions, however, we in the United States
observe instead, insistence on stricter penal-
ties and law enforcement in order to rid
society of an "annoyance." The other reason
alleged for stronger controls on the problem
is the frequent tie up between the vice and
commercialized crime, police and other gov-
ernmental corruption. Stricter suppression,
therefore, is advocated on a frankly utili-
tarian basis. What is disturbing in this spirit,
of course, is its pallid unconcern for the
rehabilitation of offenders and prevention
of the extension of the vice among greater
numbers of lower income victims.4 8
Also neglected in many discussions of the
problem is reference to the reasonable de-
mands of public morality even in our con-
temporary society, with its pluralistic moral
concepts and beliefs. As long as public mo-
rality continues to be, as so often it appears
to be, merely a question of good taste and
manners, this individualistic spirit of hedon-
ism will probably continue to guide and
inspire the legal reforms in this special area
46 Anglican Council Report to the Wolfenden
Committee, in Committee on Homosexual Offenses
and Prostitution, Report, CMD. No. 247 (1957).
47 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE 235 (Prepared Official
Draft 1962).
48 Cf. Ball & Logan, Early Sexual Behaviour of
Lower-Class Delinquent Girls, 51 J. CRIM. L.,
C. & P.S. 209 (1960).
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of sexual offenses.
Obscenity
Our survey of the contemporary legal
landscape with respect to sexual offenses
would not be complete without some con-
sideration of the problem of obscenity. Ob-
scenity, as a sex-related offense, has long
since been under the surveillance of law.
4 9
Both the meaning of the term obscene, and
the intention of legislation directed against
it, never seemed unclear to earlier ages.
Thus in 1857 Parliament passed the Lord
Campbell Act against obscene written
works. This Act was interpreted by Sir
Alexander Cockburn in 1868 in the famous
case of Queen v. Hicklin.50 It was Judge
Cockburn who decided that the test of ob-
scenity should now be "whether the tend-
ency of the matter charged as obscenity is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences, and
into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall.""'
Obscenity cases have traveled an uneven
course in the United States. Currently, in
American law, both the definition of "ob-
scenity" and the legislative intent of statutes
passed against it lie in mystery. In the case
of Roth v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court chose to define "obscene" as
"material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to the prurient interest."5 2
The language of this new test was bor-
rowed from the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code." The ALI test was de-
49 McDonald, Youth, Obscenity and the Law.
1961 WASHBURN L.J. 220.
50L.R., 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
51Id. at 371.
5r2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 (1957).
53 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957).
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liberately formulated to avoid the ambigu-
ities of the older "tendency" tests. Never-
theless, the United States Supreme Court
majority in Roth, reviewing various older
state tests, declared: "We perceive no sig-
nificant difference between the meaning of
obscenity developed in the case law and
the definition of the A.L.T. ... ,4
Since then, in the eyes of this Court, there
is no "significant difference" between the
Roth (i.e., the ALI) text and those used by
the courts in the various states, we are left,
for all purposes, with no constitutional test
for obscenity. This no man's land situation
has led some to observe:
Any one of these verbal formulas (referring
to various state tests) may be constitution-
ally acceptable as a definition of obscenity,
provided it meets the requirements that the
material be judged as a whole instead of by
its parts, and by its appeal to or effect upon
the normal person, instead of the weak and
susceptible and provided the definition is
only applied to material that the Court con-
siders obscene. For what really counts is not
definitions or verbal formulas, but the kind
of material the Court views as obscene. 55
In one sense, the vagueness as to what is
legally considered as obscene leaves the
question of the definition an open one. This
demands that commentators and all serious
students of this problem reconsider several
basic issues:
1 ) the competency of state and local gov-
ernments to legislate in this area, and
2) the validity of the legislative intent,
namely, to protect morality and/or to pre-
vent the corruption of the morals of our
youth by the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions against obscene materials.
54 Roth v. United States, supra note 52, at 487
n.20.
55 Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship:
The Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?
7 UTAH L. Rnv. 289, 292 (1961).
On the question of a state's competency
to legislate in this area of public morals, the
United States Supreme Court has left no
doubt:
It has never been held that liberty of speech
is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that
all previous restraints on speech are invalid.
[T~he protection even as to previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited. [Citing
Hughes, C. J., in Near v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 697, 715-16 (1931)].... In addition,
the Court said that "the primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against
obscene publications."5
If a state seriously attempts to regulate
materials which it considers to be obscene
and injurious to youth, a further, more prac-
tical question arises: Does a certain class of
printed or pictorial materials have the effect
of corrupting morals? There seems no doubt
that courts presently will uphold legislation
to prevent outrages of public decency. The
question then, comes down to a considera-
tion of the cause and effect ratio, if any, of
obscene materials upon youth. While ad-
dressing ourselves to this core aspect of the
topic, we do not wish at all to imply that we
here propose or advocate a "decency" stand-
ard for films and books, predicated upon the
norm of youthful ignorance, immaturity and
curious sense of good taste.
The critical issue cannot but be to decide
whether obscene materials do actually lead
to a breakdown of public morality, and es-
pecially, the corruption of our youth - sub-
stantive evils against which states certainly
can exercise their police power prerogative.
The causal relationship, here referred to,
evokes quite contrary responses. Prompted
56 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43, 47 (1961); cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (the
famous Lady Chatterly's Lover case).
by Dr. Fredric Wentham's famous book,
The Seduction of The Innocent,57 it had
been assumed that certain comic books do
influence young minds to criminal conduct.
Drs. Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen, es-
tablished authorities in the field of the psy-
chology of pornography, declare quite the
opposite."' These two scholars insist on an
important distinction between "obscenity"
and what is erotic realism in literature. As
for "obscene books," they declare: "It seems
to us undeniable that the vast majority of
'obscene books' fulfill their first and primary
function of stimulating most readers eroti-
cally," 59 or are books which "are designed
to be psychologically aphrodisiacs."6
Books containing passages of erotic real-
ism are accounted as just one of numerous
psychological stimuli of an erotic nature in
our culture. The erotic book, in its very
nature, tends to sustain the erotic stimula-
tion over a longer period of time and with
greater intensity. With these points kept in
mind, one must also consider the subjective
factors of the reader of obscene materials.
So it is that they conclude:
[W]hile it is perfectly true that the aim and,
the effect of an "obscene" book is to act as
an erotic stimulus, the ultimate test of
whether something is "obscene" cannot be
conclusively deduced from its effects; it can
only be determined on the basis of the con-
tent analysis of the book itself.6 1
These two authors see no ready answer at
the moment to the question of the measur-
able effects of reading obscene literature,
especially the causal ratio between such
reading and juvenile delinquency. They
57 WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1959).
58 KRONHAUSEN & KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY
AND THE LAW (1959).
59 Id. at 263.
60 Ibid.
61 Id. at 265.
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count on their side in this latter conclusion
the late Dr. Kinsey, Drs. Sheldon and
Eleanor Glueck, the Brown University psy-
chology team report of Drs. Levy, Lipsitt,
and Rosenblith, as well as many other con-
temporary scholars.6 2
Many present-day authorities tend to
agree with the medical viewpoint stated
above. The conclusion of some of these is
that, in keeping with the lines set down by
the United States Supreme Court in Roth6 3
and with common sense itself, obscene ma-
terials should be judged by the audience for
which they were primarily intended. As
some have put it:
This variable obscenity approach re-
quires that in each instance the finding of
obscenity be based upon the nature of the
primary audience to which the sales appeal
is made and the nature of the material's ap-
peal to that audience. In each instance the
question should be: With respect to the
primary audience is the material treated as
hard-core pornography - to satisfy or nour-
ish erotic fantasies of the sexually imma-
ture? This requires that any peripheral
audience be disregarded.64
The advantages claimed for this approach to
the Roth definition problem are:
[lI]t permits control over hard-core pornog-
raphy, or anything treated as such, without
the fiction of pretending that such stuff ap-
peals to the prurient interest of the normal
adult in order to make it fit the verbal for-
mula announced in Roth.5
Not all authorities so minimize the effect
of obscene materials upon the minds of the
young. One such voice is that of FBI Direc-
tor, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.6
62 1d. at 279.
63 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
64 Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship:
The Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?
7 UTAH L. REV. 289, 299 (1961).
6 5 Id. at 301.
66 Letter From J. Edgar Hoover to All Law En-
SEXUAL OFFENSES
Apparently, definite conclusion of the
causal ratio of obscene materials and their
effect on impressionable young minds can-
not be established. I do not think it is
enough in our society, conscious as it is of its
responsibilities to our future citizens to erad-
icate juvenile delinquency, etc., merely to
consider this problem as "peripheral" and
"to be disregarded." I would rather subscribe
to the view of L. D. McDonald,e7 that until
we know more about the causal ratio, we do
our utmost to safeguard our greatest natural
resource-our youth. He also has a practical
suggestion for a current solution or modus
vivendi with the problem:
[E]ach state should be allowed to establish
its own policy concerning obscene publica-
tions and their distribution. A statute so
worded as to punish those who sell or make
available obscene literature to youth is
within powers of the state, and is directly
comparable with the selling of alcoholic
liquors to minors. In one case the body is
injured; in the other the mind; but in both,
the community ultimately suffers the loss.
Sex intrigues all, especially the young, who
find it difficult to cope with the coming of
maturity. The natural problems are enough,
without subjecting them to unrealistic and
unnatural situations in obscene publications
that clothe these situations in normalcy."'
General Conclusion
One great impression that must come to
any student of the general problem of sex-
ual offenses vis-A-vis their legal and moral
relationships is one of uncertainty and also
of uneasiness. One senses uncertainty be-
cause there is an admitted shortage of fac-
tual data to support many of the proposed
reforms of the so-called "modern school"
in this area. One senses uneasiness because
forcement Officials, Jan. 1, 1960, in FBI Law
Enforcement Bull. (Jan. 1960).
67 McDonald, Youth, Obscenity and the Law,
1961 WASHBURN L.J. 220.
6s id. at 231.
the proposed reforms of the various con-
temporary movements for drastic changes
in our laws indicate a marked lack of prac-
ticality and the absence of hard thinking on
the foundations of the public philosophy of
law that must underpin any great changes.
In our own appraisal of the current legal
situation with regard to sexual offenses, we
have frequently had recourse to the phrase
"corruption of youth." This factor was so
stressed because, it seems to me, it must be
the overriding consideration which must be
kept in mind when we are speaking of laws
that could possibly affect the moral fitness
of our nation's greatest resource-its youth.
This motivation is only scantily obvious in
current thinking on the topic here in ques-
tion.
Finally, the state has its moral respon-
sibilities too, and social experimentation
through law is one of its most cunning temp-
tations. Such experimentation is dangerous
if predicated on a "bad man" theory of law
that harks back to Holmesian positivism.
Much is made today in discussions on the
topic of our symposium of the supposed
inhibitive influence of morality upon law.
It is instructive, I think, to recall on this
point, the insights of Professor Lon Fuller.
Speaking of the inverse ratio of the effect of
law upon morality, he said:
It should be noted that the view I am ex-
pounding here does not assert that men are,
in the ordinary affairs of life, consciously
deterred by legal penalties. It concedes that
the effective deterrents which shape the
average man's conduct derive from moral-
ity, from a sense of right and wrong. What it
asserts is that these conceptions of right and
wrong are significantly shaped by the daily
functionings of the legal order, and that
they would be profoundly altered if this
legal order were to disappear.';!
60 FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 137
(1940).
